

TIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEW

OF

MR. SAYRE STEVENS AND DR. ROBERT BOWIE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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QUESTION: You are nice to give us some time. We, as I am sure Herb explained when setting this up, were doing what we hope for TIME is a fairly complete report on the state of the intelligence community and when Bruce and I originally talked about the idea of doing such a story we thought it would be a good idea to concentrate on to get on the intelligence gathering analysis side of the intelligence community.

One reason we wanted to do it in addition to the fact that it has been an inherently interesting subject is that for the last three or four years, the considerable publicity that surrounded the Agency, the intelligence community, particularly the CIA, has been almost exclusively due to covert operations and no doubt we will touch on that subject, too, but we would like to cast it in sort of forward looking terms and also look at the side of the Agency's work which is perhaps a little less sensational and sexy but extremely important, and to sort of find out what you two gentlemen are up to and what you can tell us about some structural changes that have been made and have been contemplated.

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To lead off, I have been interested to hear about the decision I gather you have a lot to do with around the turn of the year to merge those two political offices within the DDI -- OPR and OCI -- into a new single office of regional and political analysis. Have I used the acronym correctly? Why did you do that and how does this improve the efficiency of what you are trying to do here and improve the product?

MR. STEVENS: I think that the basic motivation behind that was involved in more than just bringing the political offices together. One of those offices was largely concerned with producing current intelligence, that is producing what we call event-driven kinds of analysis as opposed to primarily issue driven or broader kinds of analysis that deal with key problems as a whole that are affecting the policy.

We realize that we were putting too much emphasis and spending too many of our resources on kind of the daily reporting function at the expense of doing deeper analysis.

The other group was totally committed to doing longer-term, more basic research kinds of things, and while that is essential and we have to do some of that, it had gotten sort of divorced from the major problems that we were trying to deal with to some extent. So we wanted to get all our assets in one spot and see if we couldn't address the more critical questions, particularly in total problem fashion, than just reporting what was going on day to day on the one

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1 hand or doing longer-term basic research that wasn't directly tied with
2 the key questions that the political community was really
3 concerned with.

4 QUESTION: Does this involve cutting back on the
5 total staff involved in political analysis within DDI?

6 MR. STEVENS: No.

7 QUESTION: You got more or less the same number of
8 troops on the ground?

9 MR. STEVENS: That is right.

10 DR. BOWIE: I am sure you understand this is
11 only one office of the DDI out of six.

12 QUESTION: That is an Office of Strategic Analysis
13 and an Office of Economic analysis, right?

14 MR. STEVENS: Weapons, intelligence and scientific
15 intelligence.

16 QUESTION: Those are two different -- weapons --

17 MR. STEVENS: Weapons intelligence, scientific
18 intelligence, economic research, regional and political
19 analysis, geographic and cartographic research.

20 QUESTION: I have lost count already.

21 MR. STEVENS: Office of Strategic Research, which
22 is really military balance kinds of questions.

23 QUESTION: So how many offices in all, five?

24 MR. STEVENS: No, there are seven -- eight altogether
25 counting the Office of Imagery Analysis and Office of Central

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1 Reference.

2 QUESTION: Is there a loose correlation between the
3 various offices and various customers? That is, does the
4 Office of Strategic Analysis primarily service the military,
5 supplementing what the military is getting from its own
6 intelligence agencies? The Office of Economic Analysis, pri-
7 marily the Commerce and Economic Offices of the State
8 Department, or is there no such?

9 DR. BOWIE: In just looking at it through the lens
10 that I see it from, that doesn't seem to be a very good --

11 MR. STEVENS: No, they are not that tightly connec-
12 ted. The Office of Economic Research works on questions that
13 are of real importance to the Department of Defense and
14 similarly the Strategic guys do a lot of work really that is
15 responsive to the State Department. They obviously have sort
16 of basic connections.

17 DR. BOWIE: Strategic analysis would be closest
18 to fitting but in general across the board the mix -- it
19 is more as if you were going on disciplines for particular
20 problems. That is not literally the way it is but it is more
21 like that, wouldn't you say, and therefore you put together
22 teams drawn from different offices depending upon the particu-
23 lar problem.

24 MR. STEVENS: The Weapons Intelligence guys analyze
25 advance weapons systems, new ABM systems, new ICBMs. They

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1 of course have some pretty close connections with parts
2 of the defense technology community, DDB&E, as well as defense
3 intelligence, but even they, as Bob has said, become parts
4 of teams that deal with broader problems.

5 QUESTION: I am interested also in the kind of
6 classified journalistic operation that you run, daily output,
7 and I guess you also have some weekly publications that
8 circulate to various people in the Executive Branch. What
9 are those publications exactly? Do you produce, for instance,
10 the President's intelligence -- what is it called?

11 MR. STEVENS: Daily brief.

12 QUESTION: What is the proper title of that?

13 MR. STEVENS: The President's Daily Brief.

14 QUESTION: And is that the most exclusive circulation
15 thing?

16 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

17 QUESTION: How many copies of that?

18 MR. STEVENS: There are five, I guess five copies.

19 QUESTION: And that is produced out of your shop?

20 MR. STEVENS: Right.

21 QUESTION: Are you in effect the managing editor of
22 that?

23 MR. STENS: We have an editorial board which consists
24 of people from various parts of the Agency that review the
25 daily product including some people from NIOs.



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1 QUESTION: Does Vance, Brown, Brzezinski get their
2 own copies of that?

3 MR. STEVENS: They all effectively see it, yes.

4 QUESTION: And isn't there another publication,
5 intelligence summary, or something like that, that has a little
6 wider circulation?

7 MR. STEVENS: Yes, there is a broader, a daily
8 publication that goes out to a broader audience that contains
9 a lot of what is in the President's daily brief but not all
10 but is still fairly selective.

11 QUESTION: What is that called?

12 MR. STEVENS: That is the National Intelligence
13 Daily.

14 QUESTION: A couple of hundred?

15 MR. STEVENS: Less than that.

16 QUESTION: Less than 100?

17 MR. STEVENS: About 100.

18 QUESTION: Is that newspaper format?

19 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

20 QUESTION: Could the two of you and particularly
21 you, Dr. Bowie, tell us a little bit more than we were able
22 to get into in the Director's Office about national estimates,
23 what he hopes to do in that area, what you hope to do, what
24 your mandate is?

25 DR. BOWIE: Well, the mandate is really, I suppose,

1 the same one that existed from the beginning of the Agency,
2 namely to produce objective and relevant analyses of either
3 particular situations, particular regions, particular issues,
4 or more broadly longer-term looks at trends and tendencies.

5 The purpose is to provide the underpinning of informa-
6 tion necessary for people that are going to try to make policy
7 decisions in all the different fields of foreign policy so you
8 have some estimates which deal primarily with strategic
9 military issues, some which deal with economics, and some which
10 deal with (?) proliferation. Essentially any topic or every
11 topic that is subject to policymaking is a suitable subject
12 for some kind of intelligence contributions. Among the most
13 important of those it takes the form of a national intelligence
14 estimate, sort of a formal coordinated product of the -- it
15 is really the Director's product. It is the Director's responsi-
16 bility to issue those, but they reflect the combined analysis
17 and views of particularly the State Department and of the
18 Defense Department so they are what is called coordinated.

19 There are in addition a fair number of items which I
20 would say are equally important but which are not necessarily
21 coordinated products. They are a product basically of the
22 source of the agency. But even there they may be informal,
23 touching base with some of the other interested agencies in order
24 for you to get their comments or make sure you are not far
25 off even though they are not formally coordinated.



1 And then we just completed -- and Sayre can talk about
2 this -- the research segment of the operation which is under
3 Sayre's direction which produces a very large number of regular
4 studies and research contributions, some analytical pieces.
5 Some of these are for in-house use, sort of building blocks, more
6 within the intelligence community. Others are made available
7 to consumers for particular uses or routine purposes, or they
8 don't require the more formal proceedings -- weekly estimates or
9 inter-agency memoranda or other more elaborate procedures -- to
10 assure you have got the input of different parts of the intelli-
11 gency community.

12 But the range is comprehensive. As I was saying
13 earlier, it covers waterfronts of things which have a bearing
14 on the making of foreign policy and one that gets, I suppose,
15 most -- assume to exist on the part of the public is the
16 estimates of our Soviet military capability, strategic capa-
17 bilities, and those of course are relevant to both the planning
18 of the Defense Department and any SALT negotiations.

19 There is a whole range of military and arms control
20 features, and the result is of course you have not just a
21 single estimate but a whole lot of additional things which draw
22 on these basic estimates which attempt to fit that information
23 to the needs so, say, either a particular set of SALT proposals
24 or reactions to Soviet proposals, or the like.

25 So you have sort of a basic ongoing research which is

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1 under the direction of Sayre, and then the efforts through
2 the IO's to draw on this resource, this research capability,
3 frequently also to combine it with the research capabilities
4 from IR or DIA according to subject matter and pull together
5 a consolidated piece of estimating which is designed to be
6 addressed to either, as I say, to an issue or a situation
7 in a particular region, country, or SALT proposal, or you name
8 it.

9 QUESTION: How many of these are ordered up as
10 opposed to generated out of the intelligence community?

11 DR. BOWIE: I am too new at the job to generalize.
12 I have only been on here two months. I will let Sayre answer
13 that.

14 MR. STEVENS: Well, I think probably the larger
15 part are ordered up or are scheduled estimate production
16 that has been regular to the extent that it is anticipated and
17 expected of us. We couldn't not do it.

18 DR. BOWIE: I think "ordered up" is too narrow a
19 phrase because it is clear that certain kinds of subjects are
20 on the agenda, the policy, and then you know already you are
21 going to need and want parallel estimates for such obvious
22 things as, say, the Middle East, South Africa, and so on. And
23 then you have got some things which are just obviously going
24 to be required like the military estimates as a regular
25 thing. So I would say that probably -- I don't know what your

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1 percentages would be -- but will you produce the following,
2 but a very large proportion are certainly generated by
3 obvious needs or obvious requirements generated by events or
4 policy proposals which are within the office or discussion
5 so that they certainly are to a very large part tailored
6 to fit the circumstances as they obviously are going to
7 emerge. I think in a way too few, and this is just a result
8 of the inevitable pressures of time, too few are what you might
9 call efforts to back away from the immediate problems,
10 immediate events, to get a somewhat longer-term look at the
11 way things are going or trends or problems that are a little
12 bit over a horizon, and I hope among other things to do a
13 little more of that, but I think it is inevitable that the
14 major part of the product will be added to what are already
15 recognized as policy issues, policy problems.

16 QUESTION: There has been a fairly lively in-group
17 debate about whether the intelligence estimate process was
18 better when you had a board or better under the NIO system.
19 Is the management generally content with the system as it
20 exists or will there be some more changes coming along in the
21 estimate process?

22 DR. BOWIE: Really since I have been on board
23 one of the principal things I have been trying to assess, in
24 answer to that question, my impression is that the board, say,
25 by 1973, had somewhat run out of steam. It was not the same.



1 It was not as effective, not as relevant, not as efficient
2 or suitable as it had been set up in 1952 by Langer.

3 There were a number of reasons for this. I am not terribly
4 eager to have these all quoted.

5 QUESTION: Would you like to put it off the record?

6 DR. BOWIE: -- put it off the record not to explain
7 it to you but I don't want it quoted in so many words. Will
8 you treat it this way? Basically it seemed to me that it
9 had become too routine to promote people up onto the board.
10 Too many had stayed too long, work was actually being done
11 in an active sense by too limited a number.

12 The Board to some extent had become somewhat of
13 an ivory tower and a little too removed, a little bit too
14 Olympian -- this is my impression.

15 QUESTION: Was this because of the system or because
16 of the people?

17 DR. BOWIE: Well, it was a combination of circum-
18 stances, it seems to me, and then you had the period,
19 frankly, of the Nixon-Kissinger period when I don't really
20 think they wanted this kind of intelligence, so as a result
21 of this partly isolated because they didn't want it here,
22 this sort of objective analysis, and altogether it seemed to
23 me -- I am just basing this on what I have learned by talking
24 to people -- but it seemed to have lost some of its steam
25 and vigor and I think the NIOs was an effort to convert to a

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1 system that would be more in contact with the needs of users
2 and more responsive to the requirements and more able to
3 draw on all the variety of assets which were available. The
4 method used by the Board was to have its own staff do its
5 own drafting to essentially have contributions from others,
6 and I think this created a feeling on the part of lots of
7 the analysts that they were just being used. Would that be
8 a fair statement?

9 MR. STEVENS: Yes, I think they tended to feel that
10 they were not a part of the critical end game of the whole
11 business which is producing the estimate, and often times
12 there were gaps. The analysts, when the chips are down, are
13 the guys that really know the facts and the details and
14 the ins and outs and the nuances that are key in putting it
15 all together and you have to get those people really
16 individually deeply involved in the thing in order to make
17 best use of them, and that had sort of broken down.

18 MR. BOWIE: I think there is another objective
19 fact of which I sort of mentioned earlier and that is the
20 expanse and breadth of that subject matter. The subject
21 matter in the first period, say 50's, was very heavily focused
22 on the analysis of Soviet military capabilities and related
23 things and you could have people who might not themselves
24 be experts on those issues but nevertheless were pretty
25 good at reviewing and giving (unclear) and so on. And the

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1 relations to others like allies and so on was pretty much
2 foreign policy type relations. It seems to me now the
3 things you have to get into require much more expert knowledge
4 and depth over a much wider range of subject matter and there-
5 fore the need for finding a better way to mobilize
6 the expertise than merely a rather limited number of people
7 who were the staff of the board seemed to me was just inherent.
8 It wasn't so much that the people -- many of the people on
9 the staff were very good people but nevertheless they couldn't
10 necessarily be masters of all the subject matter.

11 I think the new system was designed to try to meet
12 the best of both worlds. I don't think it is ideal as it now
13 operates because obviously different NIOs handle it in
14 different ways. I personally think that it is at its best
15 when the NIO does make a real substantive contribution but
16 is able to draw together a group of analysts who really
17 make up a working party or a team so that you really do have
18 a genuine collaboration, maybe from within the agency, by
19 ideally including people from INR or DIA, and then you really
20 do have then a joint --

21 QUESTION: -- Johns Hopkins just for instance,
22 getting back to what we were talking about earlier, avoiding
23 the team by team dichotomy, but bringing in people from out-
24 side.

25 DR. BOWIE: But we haven't actually done that as I

1 have said, to this point. It is perfectly conceivable that
2 you could bring in an external expert on certain kinds of things
3 But in any event it seems to me the ideal of these to the NIOs
4 was to be able to both have the mobilizing capability which
5 they could provide and at the same time utilize the expertise
6 in the research parts of the staff.

7 Now both of us would agree, I am sure, that it
8 didn't always work ideally. Sometimes the things are too much
9 cut and paste, not really integrated by the NIO. Sometimes
10 talent that you want isn't necessarily all there.

11 QUESTION: When an NIO produced an estimate,
12 came up and reached its customer, it had his name on it?

13 QUESTION: Or hers in some cases?

14 DR. BOWIE: Not strictly. It was still the
15 Director's product. Let me just add one other thing. I
16 think that one of the losses in disbanding the Board was
17 that the quality control function got lost a bit, so every-
18 thing depends upon the NIO's own ability to monitor the
19 quality. I think we are going to have to go back to some
20 additional forms of quality control whether it is some kind
21 of review panel or probably the use of outsiders to some
22 degree as a review or device, not to Team A, but the use of
23 experts from outside to perhaps review.

24 QUESTION: Are we on the record, by the way?

25 DR. BOWIE: Yes, I am sorry.



1 MR. STEVENS: I think that would really help the
2 process to have that kind of review. The Board really used
3 to be very good. I of course sort of grew up in the
4 scientific and technical parts of the analysis business
5 here in the agency. They were extremely good at really
6 forcing people who are experts in the narrow field to
7 present the information in ways that it is understood by people
8 who are not experts in that field, and really forcing some
9 kind of simple-minded logical scrutiny on the analysis that
10 is done that often times is lost in the detailed treatment
11 of the subject. And I think that is important.

12 DR. BOWIE: And at their best I think they were
13 able to say what are the premises on which we are pursuing
14 our analysis, and it seems to me that some of the mistakes
15 in intelligence like any other thinking are due to unanalyzed
16 premises, which you then sort of treat as obvious and go on
17 from there, and it seems to me that the good Board, made
18 of really good critical minds who aren't afraid to ask the
19 kinds of questions that experts maybe don't ask of one another
20 can say, "Wait a minute. Where are we starting from here?"
21 In other words, I am perfectly sure that the good review
22 panel -- I don't think we should go back to the old system
23 in the sense of recreating the old board, but I think that
24 portion of the function of the board which was a function
25 of review, probing, quality control, is something that is

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1 currently lacking and needs to be reinvented. I happen
2 to think also that for some purposes the use of outside
3 experts as a review device would be useful, but it seems to
4 me that we can combine both the in-house board or panel
5 type thing and the external group of consultants who you bring
6 in two or three, not to do a Team B polarized thing but to
7 be a critical analysis of is this a good study. Is it objec-
8 tive? Is it well done? And if you get people from different
9 points of view, you may not ask them to agree with the
10 outcome, you can just ask them to certify that it is quite a
11 respectable outcome. At least that is my conception of the
12 outside panel kind of thing. Sayer may have a little more
13 on that.

14 MR. STEVENS: No.

15 QUESTION: The national estimate process is not in and of
16 the CIA, is that correct? It is answerable to the Director
17 in his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence; is that
18 right? The estimators can range across the entire Board?

19 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

20 QUESTION: What about within the CIA itself,
21 within the DDI, has there been some use of outsiders here
22 and is that likely to continue?

23 MR. STEVENS: Yes, indeed. We rely very heavily
24 on outsiders in a lot of different ways. We have a large
25 number of contracts for outside analytical support issues,



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1 particularly in technical areas, economic areas, and so
2 on, military. We rely very heavily on that. But we have
3 lots and lots of consultants who review our papers and talk
4 to us about problems that we have and we have continuing
5 relationships with a lot of people in the private sector
6 and other parts of the government, and so on. It is critically
7 important for us to maintain that. We really have to do
8 that.

9 QUESTION: I was going to say that, because as
10 Strobe said, one of the points we are going to make in this
11 piece is the preponderance of effort here lying on the
12 analytical side, intelligence side, rather than in clandes-
13 tine operations.

14 I wanted to bring out the point that some of your
15 favorite authors, Marks and Marquetti, say that this is not
16 true, that the preponderance of effort does go into the clandes-
17 tine side. Is there some way that we can illustrate the point
18 that we are about to try to make in terms of effort, percen-
19 tages of people, percentages of the attention of the leader-
20 ship of the Agency or something that will show us some evidence
21 of the preponderance of intelligence and analysis?

22 MR. STEVENS: Well, I think there has been -- I
23 think it is pretty clear from one who operates within the
24 system that the driving concern really in most of the agency
25 activities really runs into the end game in trying to answer

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1 specific intelligence questions. Now I am not sure you
2 can, and we couldn't anyway, relate that in terms of percen-
3 tages of manpower and so on, but the major collection efforts
4 whether they be clandestine, technical or whatever it may
5 be, have been driven really by unanswered and for the moment
6 unanswerable kinds of questions that we are faced with in
7 doing the analytical job, and that is really borne out pretty
8 clearly, I think, looking at the past.

9 DR. BOWIE: I think you have to make the distinction
10 even here between clandestine collection and covert action.
11 Of course you know my own impression is that you don't reat
12 technical means of collection as clandestine merely because
13 they are classified. I take it you don't mean that.

14 QUESTION: Yes.

15 DR. BOWIE: If you really mean the clandestine
16 meaning that in the (unclear) sense.

17 QUESTION: Operations.

18 DR. BOWIE: Well, I mean even clandestine collec-
19 tion.

20 QUESTION: He meant to the clandestine service.
21 I mean, even if you take that in its broadest sense, at least
22 as I observe it as a total newcomer to this part of this
23 side of the fence, I simply don't see it. It may well be
24 that in the past particularly when there were directors like
25 Allen who were much interested in the covert activity and there

1 was an entirely different environment, I couldn't answer it.
2 But all I can say is that as of now it seems to me that the
3 clandestine activity is really a very modest part of the
4 enterprise even as seen by the operation day to day,
5 during the day, in terms of what gets the attention of the
6 Director, in terms of what happens at the staff meetings, in
7 terms of what happens in terms of people's attention in the
8 building.

9 MR. STEVENS: Except I think it is important to
10 make the point that the contribution of clandestine collection
11 to our job is extraordinarily important; it really is.

12 DR. BOWIE: I didn't mean to minimize that. I was
13 saying it is simply now, as I see it, it is one of the
14 streams that feeds in, an important one, sure, but it is one
15 of the streams of information. It feeds in and it doesn't
16 seem to me it --

17 MR. STEVENS: But it is terribly important.

18 DR. BOWIE: It certainly is in my mind seen as a
19 source or servant of what you need in order to produce good --

20 QUESTION: I think it vulgarized what Marks and
21 Marquetti were saying that the DDI is a front for the DDO,
22 very simply.

23 QUESTION: As a veteran of the DDS&T, you may
24 address yourself to this. Isn't the fruits of satellites
25 and that kind of intelligence gathering technique, highly



1 technological, high altitude, non-manned, a major part of
2 your input here?

3 DR. BOWIE: Of course.

4 MR. STEVENS: Yes.

5 QUESTION: Are there problems about talking about
6 this on the record?

7 MR. STEVENS: Indeed.

8 Let me say that new technical means of intelligence
9 collection are tremendously important and they have enabled
10 us to do the things that were absolutely impossible to do
11 in years past. But they don't answer all the questions and
12 I think where all of us are feeling deeply our shortcomings
13 in in answering now a lot of the questions that lie behind much
14 of the work we do. What is it that is really driving the
15 Soviets in producing all the weapons systems they are producing
16 and continuing to move ahead with this sort of inexorable
17 program that they have got? The fact that we have gotten to
18 the point where we are really beginning to worry and agonize
19 those problems is only because they have been able now to answer
20 a whole bunch of other questions like identifying the fact
21 that new weapons systems are being developed and tested,
22 getting an idea of what their characteristics are, the kinds
23 of changes and improvements that have been made. And that has
24 come hard so we are now moving into the kind of the next layer
25 of problems which as you might expect are really the key problems

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1 and those questions increasingly demand of us an understanding
2 of the foreign perceptions and foreign understandings of what
3 the United States looks like to them militarily. This is
4 where the clandestine collection makes a peculiarly important
5 contribution.

6 DR. BOWIE: I think this illustrates a fundamental
7 point and part of what the Director said about the two facts,
8 that American predominance is not what it once was. We don't
9 just call the tune, And secondly, the world we are living
10 in of interdependence absolutely demands cooperation on many
11 fronts. When you want to cooperate with a lot of countries,
12 even if it is a hostile country, for instance, we want to
13 make arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union, we have
14 just got to be able to see the world through their eyes. We
15 have got to see how they view things if you want to get deals
16 and make arrangements. Or with friends, if we want to work
17 on the proliferation problem with the Germans, we have just got to
18 see how they see reprocessing, how they see their need for uranium,
19 because otherwise you talk past one another, and so as Sayre
20 was saying, you really much more need when you have a world in
21 which you are trying to generate cooperative arrangements as
22 just deterrence, say, of the Soviet Union, you really have to
23 understand how the systems work, what their priorities are, how
24 they see the world, what it is they want in their terms. Then
25 you can find grounds, bases, for working together.

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1 But you cannot do that by mere imaging them from
2 your own view of the world, your priorities or your way of
3 thinking.

4 QUESTION: This is as opposed to more simplistic
5 kinds of troop counting, how many troops do they have in
6 Romania.

7 QUESTION: Is this new, this episode you are talking
8 about?

9 DR. BOWIE: It seems to me that as a result of
10 the evolution of the situation it becomes even more urgent,
11 more necessary. Sure it is always necessary to try to put
12 yourself in the other fellow's shoes when you are trying to
13 work with the other fellow, but it almost seems to me that
14 there really is almost a change in order of magnitude in order
15 of the necessity to be able to see things through the other
16 people's eyes that you want to work with and understand their
17 political processes and social processes so you can really
18 understand how you can work together.

19 It seems to me this puts new demands on the whole
20 analytical process.

21 QUESTION: Does it also increase the risk that
22 you will be accused by everybody that criticizes you, that you
23 are intervening in policymaking, that by psychoanalyzing the
24 opposition or even friends you are trying to manipulate the
25 policy response as opposed to just telling the consumer at the

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NSC or wherever that --

DR. BOWIE: It seems to me any real good intelligence has the occupational hazard of being charged with trying to influence policy, because in a certain fundamental sense trying to depict the actual conditions with which a person must contend if he is trying to affect those conditions, sets parameters, sets limits. It establishes obstacles with which he must cope.

Now if you wish, in doing that you are certainly affecting the landscape that he is dealing with. That is what your purpose is. But you are not trying to tell him how he should deal with it. It is a very fine line, but it seems to me if we are not making the policymakers' problem more vivid, we are not doing our job, and if that means -- in a certain sense you are saying to him this route is just not open to you and this route may be possible, but if you are doing it honestly you are not saying you must make this choice, you just say this as best we can make it out is the way it is.

MR. STEVENS: It is harder to deal with some of these problems with the same high credibility that you can sometimes achieve in doing technical analysis, for example, which leaves you as you suggest, more open to the challenge to the charge that you are putting out --

QUESTION: But as you say it would become easier now to say how many tanks they have so now you have to go to

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1 the next stage.

2 MR. STEVENS: Easier and perhaps less important.

3 DR. BOWIE: We have got an appointment at 5:00.

4 Now you can do either of two things. You can ask whether we
5 can get an indulgence or whatever they want, or --

6 QUESTION: I think we have pretty well covered it.
7 You have been very indulgent with us.

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